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Abstract
A key question in biological systems is whether genetic diversity persists in the long run un-
der evolutionary competition or whether a single dominant genotype emerges. Classic work by
Kalmus in 1945 [16] has established that even in simple diploid species (species with two chro-
mosomes) diversity can be guaranteed as long as the heterozygote individuals enjoy a selective
advantage. Despite the classic nature of the problem, as we move towards increasingly polymor-
phic traits (e.g., human blood types) predicting diversity and understanding its implications is
still not fully understood. Our key contribution is to establish complexity theoretic hardness
results implying that even in the textbook case of single locus diploid models predicting whether
diversity survives or not given its fitness landscape is algorithmically intractable.
We complement our results by establishing that under randomly chosen fitness landscapes
diversity survives with significant probability. Our results are structurally robust along several
dimensions (e.g., choice of parameter distribution, different definitions of stability/persistence,
restriction to typical subclasses of fitness landscapes). Technically, our results exploit connec-
tions between game theory, nonlinear dynamical systems, complexity theory and biology and
establish hardness results for predicting the evolution of a deterministic variant of the well
known multiplicative weights update algorithm in symmetric coordination games which could
be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
The beauty and complexity of natural ecosystems have always been a source of fascination
and inspiration for the human mind. The exquisite biodiversity of Galapagos’ ecosystem, in fact,
inspired Darwin to propose his theory of natural selection as an explanatory mechanism for the
origin and evolution of species. This revolutionary idea can be encapsulated in the catch phrase
”survival of the fittest”1. Natural selection promotes the survival of those genetic traits that provide
to their carriers an evolutionary advantage.
A marker of the true genius behind any paradigm is its longevity and in this respect the success
of natural selection is without precedent. The formalized study of evolution, dating back to the
work of Fisher, Haldane, and Wright in the beginning of the twentieth century, still and to a large
extent focuses on simple, almost toy-like, alas concrete, models of this famous aphorism and the
experimental and theoretical analysis of them. Despite this unassuming facade, if one digs a little
deeper, and delves even into the most basic of questions, how/under what circumstances does
natural selection preserve genetic diversity, a puzzling web of connections is revealed that couples
biology, game theory, nonlinear dynamical systems, topology, and computationally complexity into
a tightly interwoven bundle. Our understanding of this web of relationships is still rather fragmented
with the classic results in the area focusing on isolated facets of this space.
Arguably, the most influential result in the area of mathematical biology is Fisher’s fundamental
theorem of natural selection (1930) [11]. It states that the rate of increase in fitness of any organism
at any time is equal to its genetic variance in fitness at that time. In the classical model of population
genetics (Fisher-Wright-Haldane, discrete or continuous version) of single loci multi-allele diploid
models it implies that the average fitness of the species populations is always strictly increasing
unless we are at an equilibrium. In fact, convergence to equilibrium is pointwise even if there exist
continuum of equilibria (See [20] and references therein). From a dynamical systems perspective,
this a rather strong characterization, since it establishes that the average fitness acts as a Lyapunov
function for the system and that every trajectory converges to an equilibrium.
Besides the purely dynamical systems interpretation, an alternative, more palpable, game the-
oretic interpretation of these genetic systems is possible. Specifically, these systems can be in-
terpreted as symmetric coordination/partnership two-agent games2 where each agent applies a
(discrete-time version of) replicator dynamics3 and where both agents start from the same mixed
initial strategy. The analogies are as follows: The proportions of different alleles in the initial pop-
ulation encode the starting common mixed strategy. The random mating in the next time epoch is
captured as two symmetric agents applying the same mixed strategy (allele mixture) against each
other. Each pairing of two alleles/strategies defines an individual with a specific fitness. This is
the common utility of each of the two agents at the specific outcome. Therefore, the game between
the two agents is a coordination/partnership game and furthermore since both Aa and aA allele
combinations encode the same individual the payoff/fitness matrix is also symmetric. Finally, the
updates of the mixed strategies/allele frequencies promote the survival of the fittest strategies as
captured exactly by replicator/MWUA dynamics.
In game theoretic language, the fundamental theorem of natural selection implies that the
social welfare of the game acts as potential for the game dynamics. The dynamics converge to
mixed strategies such that the expected utility of each strategy played with positive probability are
equal to each other, a superset of the symmetric Nash equilibria.
1The phrase ”survival of the fittest” was coined by Herbert Spencer.
2A coordination/partnership game is a game where at each outcome all agents receive the same utility.
3Replicator dynamics (as well as their discrete variants) are close analogues to the well known multiplicative
updates (MWUA) family of dynamics [17].
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These topological, game theoretic results do not provide any insight on the survival of genetic
diversity. This depends on the polymorphism as well as the stability of the equilibria. One way to
formalize this question is to ask whether (given a specific fitness landscape, symmetric coordination
game) there exists an equilibrium with support size of at least two which has a region of attrac-
tion of positive measure. The answer to this question for the minimal case of two alleles (alleles
a/A, individuals aa/aA/AA) is textbook knowledge and can be traced back to the classic work of
Kalmus (1945) [16]. The intuitive answer here is that diversity can survive when the heterozygote
individuals, aA, have a fitness advantage. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that even
if evolution tries to dominate the genetic landscape by aA individuals, the random genetic mix-
ing during reproduction will always produce some aa,AA individuals, so the equilibrium that this
process is bound to reach will be mixed. On the other hand, it is trivial to create instances where
homozygote individuals are the dominant species regardless of the initial condition.
As we increase the size/complexity of the fitness landscape, not only is not clear that a tight
characterization of the diversity-inducing fitness landscape exists (a question about global stability
of nonlinear dynamical systems), but moreover, it is even less clear whether one can decide efficiently
whether such conditions are satisfied by a given fitness landscape (a computational complexity
consideration). How can one address this combined challenge and furthermore, how can one account
for the apparent genetic diversity of the ecosystems around us?
In a nutshell, we establish that the decision version of the problem is computationally hard. This
core result is shown to be robust across a number of directions. Deciding the existence of stable
polymorphic equilibria remains hard under a host of different definitions of stability examined
in the dynamical systems literature. The hardness results persist even if we restrict the set of
allowable landscape instances to reflect typical instance characteristics. Despite the hardness of
the decision problems, randomly chosen fitness landscapes are shown to support polymorphism
with significant probability (at least 1/3). The game theoretic interpretation of our results allow
for proving hardness results for understanding standard game theoretic dynamics in symmetric
coordination games. We believe that this is an important result of independent interest as it
points out at a different source of complexity in understanding social dynamics. Even in economic
settings, where the computational complexity of identifying a sample (Nash) equilibrium is trivial
(as in symmetric two-agent coordination games) the intricacy of social dynamics may add a layer
of complexity that obfuscates even the most basic characteristics of future system states.
2 Technical Overview
To study survival of diversity in diploidy, we need to understand characteristics of the limiting
population under evolutionary pressure. We focus ob the simplest case of single locus (gene) species.
For this case, evolution under natural selection has been shown to follow replicator dynamics in
symmetric two-player coordination games [20], where the genes on two chromosomes are players
and alleles are their strategies. Losert and Akin established pointwise convergence through a
potential/Lyapunov function argument [20]; here average fitness is the potential. The limiting
population corresponds (almost surely) to stable fixed points (FP) of this dynamic. Thus to make
predictions about diversity we need to characterize and compute these limiting fixed-points.
Let L denote the set of fixed points (FP) with region of attraction of positive measure. Given a
random starting point our dynamics converge to such a FP with positive probability. As it turns out
an exact characterization of L may be unlikely. Instead we try to capture it as closely as possible
through different stability notions. First we consider two standard notions defined by Lyapunov,
the stable and asymptotically stable FP. Stable fixed-point are fixed points such that if we start
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close enough to them we stay close for all time, while in case of asymptotically stable FP, if we
start close enough the trajectory furthermore converges to it. (Definition 4.6). Thus asymptotically
stable ⊆ L follows.
Characterization of these stability notions using the absolute values of eigenvalues (EVal) of the
Jacobian is well known: if the Jacobian at a fixed-point has an Eval > 1 then the FP is un-stable
(complement of stable), and if all Eval < 1 then it is asymptotically stable. The case when all Eval
≤ 1 with equality holding for some, is the ambiguous one. In that case we can say nothing about
the stability because the Jacobian does not suffice, i.e., we need to compute the Hessian etc. We
will call these fixed points linearly-stable.
Under some assumptions on the update rule of the dynamics (the function has to be a diffeomor-
phism) it is true that at a fixed-point, say x, if some EVal > 1 then the direction of corresponding
eigenvector is repelling, and therefore any starting vector with a component of this vector can never
converge to x. Thus points converging to x can not have positive measure. Using this as an intu-
ition we show that L ⊆ linearly-stable FPs. In other words points converging to linearly-un-stable
fixed-points have zero measure (Theorem 4.10). This theorem is heavily utilized to understand
(non-)existence of diversity.
Efficient verification requires efficient computation. However, note that whether a fixed-point
is (asymptotically) stable or not does not seem easy to verify. To achieve this we define two more
notions: Nash stable and strict Nash stable.
It is easy to see that Nash equilibria of the corresponding coordination game are fixed-points of
the replicator dynamics (but not vice-versa). Keeping this in mind we define Nash stable FP, which
is a Nash equilibrium and the sub-matrix corresponding to its support satisfies certain −ve semi-
definiteness. The latter condition is derived from the fact that stability relates to local optima and
also from Sylvester’s law of inertia [35]. For strict Nash stable both conditions are strict, namely
strict Nash equilibrium and −ve definite. Combining all of these notions we show the following:
Theorem 2.1 (Informal).
Strict Nash stable ⊆ Asymptotically stable ⊆ L ⊆ linearly-stable = Nash stable
⊇
stable ⊆ linearly-stable = Nash stable
We give an example where these notions don’t coincide. Let xt+1 be the next step for the
following update rules: f(xt) =
1
2xt, g(xt) = xt − 12x2t , h(xt) = xt + x
3
t
2 , d(xt) = xt. Then 0 is
asymptotically stable, stable and linearly stable and 0 ∈ L for f , it is linearly stable and ∈ L but is
not stable/as. stable for g, it is linearly stable but not stable/as. stable and /∈ L for h and finally
it linearly stable and stable but not as.stable and /∈ L for d.
We must stress the fact that generically, these sets coincide. It can be shown [21] for example
that given your fitness matrix, if you give a random perturbation, then all fixed-points will have
Jacobian with eigenvalues that don’t lie on the unit circle. These fixed-points are called hyperbolic.
Formally, if you consider the dynamics as an operator (called Fisher operator) then the set of
hyperbolic operators is dense in the space of Fisher operators.
Our primary goal was to see if diversity is going to survive. We formalize this by checking
whether set L contains a mixed point, i.e., where more than one strategies have non-zero probability,
implying that diversity survives with some positive probability. In Section 6 we show that for all five
notions of stability, checking existence of mixed FP is NP-hard. This in turn gives NP-hardness
for checking survival of diversity as well.
Theorem 2.2 (Informal). Given a symmetric matrix A, it is NP-hard to check if it has mixed
(asymptotically) stable, linear-stable, or (strict) Nash stable fixed-point. This implies that it is
NP-hard to check whether diversity survives for a given fitness matrix.
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All our reductions are from k-clique - given an undirected graph
check if it has a clique of size k; a well known NP-hard problem. We
design one main reduction and show that it works for all the notions
of stability using Theorem 5.6. Here, as shown in Figure 1, the main
idea is to use a modified version of adjacency matrix E of the graph
as one of the blocks in the payoff matrix, such that, (i) clique of size
k or more implies a stable Nash equilibrium in that block, and (ii) all
stable mixed equilibria are only in that block. Here E′ is modification
of E where off-diagonal zeros are replaced with −h where h is a large
(polynomial-size number).
E ′
-
k-1
k-1
k-1
k-1
h
h
-
-
-
-
-
Figure 1: Matrix of equa-
tions 3, section 6.1
Let A be 2n × 2n symmetric fitness matrix of Figure 1, where first n strategies correspond to
n node of the graph. For (i) given a k-clique we construct maximal clique containing it, say of
size m, and then show that probability 1m for strategies corresponding to nodes in the clique, and
zero otherwise, gives (strict Nash) stable FP. To show (ii) we use −ve semi-definiteness property of
Nash stable (which contains all other notions), which implies Aii ≤ 2Aij for all i, j in the support a
Nash stable FP. Therefore if h > 2(k−1), then none of {n+1, . . . , 2n} can be in the support. Next
we concentrate on only strategies that have big enough probability, call it set S. Nash equilibrium
property of Nash stable, −hs and k − 1s entries in A force each non-zero probability to be ≤ 1k .
Using these facts we show |S| ≥ k and the corresponding vertices in G form a clique. So We prove
existence of k-clique.
The fitness matrices created in above hardness results are very specific, while one could argue
that real-life fitness matrices may be more random. So is it easy to check survival of diversity in
a typical matrix? Or is it easy to check if a given allele survives? We answer negatively for both
of these. There has been a lot of work on understanding decision versions of Nash equilibrium in
general games [13, 4, 30, 12], whereas to the best of our knowledge these are the first NP-hardness
results for coordination games, and therefore may be of independent interest.
Finally we show that even though checking is hard, on an average things are not that bad. In
Section D we prove that,
Theorem 2.3 (Informal). If the fitness matrix is picked at uniformly at random then with signifi-
cantly high probability, at least 13 , diversity will surely survive.
Sure survival happens if every fixed-point in L is mixed. We show that this fact is ensured
if every diagonal entry (i, i) of the fitness matrix is dominated by some entry in it’s row or col-
umn. Essentially, this condition makes the corresponding two player coordination game to have
no symmetric pure Nash equilibrium. By considering matrices with entries i.i.d from a continuous
distribution (so that the probability to get the same number twice is zero), we show that with
probability bounded away from zero for all size of matrices this condition is satisfied (theorem
D.6). To do this, we use some inclusion-exclusion argument to avoid the correlations (the matrix
is symmetric so there are dependencies).
3 Related Work
In the last few years we have witnessed a rapid cascade of theoretical results on the intersection
of computer science and evolution. Livnat et al. [18] introduced the notion of mixability, the ability
of an allele to combine itself successfully with other alleles within a specific population. In [2, 1]
connections where established between haploid evolution and game theoretic dynamics in coordina-
tion games. Even more recently Meir and Parkes [23] provided a more detailed examination of these
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connections. These dynamics are close variants of the standard (discrete) replicator dynamics [14].
Replicator dynamics is closely connected to the multiplicative weights update algorithm [17]. Anal-
ogous game theoretic interpretations are known for diploids [20]. It is also possible to introduce
connections between satisfiability and evolution [19].
The error threshold is the rate of errors in genetic mixing above which genetic information
disappears [9]. Vishnoi [32] showed existence of such sharp thresholds. Moreover, in [33] he sheds
light on the speed of evolution. Finally, in [7] Dixit, Srivastava and Vishnoi present finite population
models for asexual haploid evolution that closely track the standard infinite population model of
Eigen [8]. Due to space limitations we present information related to biology in appendix, see E.1.
The complexity of computing whether a game has an evolutionarily stable strategy has been
studied first by Nissan and then by Etessami and Lochbihler [27, 10] and has recently been nailed
down to be ΣP2 -complete by Conitzer [3]. These results are not directly comparable to our own
since they apply for general symmetric bimatrix games. More critically, these decision problems
are completely orthogonal to understanding the persistence of genetic diversity.
In [22] Mehta, Panageas and Piliouras examine the question of diversity for haploid species.
Despite the systems’ superficial similarities the two analyses come to starkly different conclusions.
In haploids systems all mixed (polymorphic) equilibria are unstable and evolution converges to
monomorphic states. In the case of diploid systems the answer to whether diversity survives or not
depends crucially on the geometry of the fitness landscape. This is not merely a question about
stability of fixed points but requires careful combinations of tools from topology of dynamical
systems, stability analysis of fixed points as well as complexity theoretic techniques.
4 Preliminaries
In this section we briefly describe the evolutionary dynamics on diploids with single locus
[24, 25, 20, 21], and relate it to a 2-player symmetric coordination game.
Notations: We use boldface letters, like x, to denote column vectors, and xi is its i
th coordinate.
Vectors 0n and 1n are n-D vectors with all zeros and ones. For matrix A, Aij is the entry in i
th
row and jth column. By norm ||.|| we mean ||.||∞. [n] denotes set {1, . . . , n}, and ∆n denotes n-D
simplex, and let SP (x) be {i | xi > 0}.
4.1 Evolutionary dynamics
Consider a diploid single locus species, with n alleles numbered 1, . . . , n. The fitness of such a
species can be represented by an n × n matrix A, where Aij denotes fitness of an individual with
chromosome pair (i, j). Clearly, A is a symmetric matrix. Let x ∈ ∆n represent the proportion
of alleles in the current population, then under the evolutionary process of natural-selection this
proportion changes as per the following multi-variate function f : ∆n → ∆n; in the literature this
is often called Discrete Replicator Dynamics.
x′ = f(x) where x′i = fi(x) = xi
(Ax)i
xTAx
, ∀i ∈ [n] (1)
f is a continuous function with convex, compact domain (= range), and therefore always has a
fixed-point [15]. Further, limit points of f have to be fixed-points, i.e., x such that f(x) = x.
Fact 4.1. Profile x is a fixed-point of f iff ∀i ∈ [n], xi > 0⇒ (Ax)i = xTAx.
A fundamental question is: starting from arbitrary population of alleles how does the population
look like in limit under evolutionary pressures? Does it even converge to a limit point? In other
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words is f going to converge? If so, then how do these limit points look like? Fisher’s Fundamental
Theorem of Natural Selection [20, 21] says that mean fitness function
pi(x) = xTAx
(potential function in game theory terms) satisfies the inequality pi(f(x)) ≥ pi(x) and the equality
holds iff x is a fixed-point. Losert and Akin [20, 21] showed that the dynamics above converge
point-wise to fixed-points and that the rule of the dynamics f is a diffeomorphism in ∆n.
4.2 Games, Nash equilibria and symmetries
In this paper we consider two-player (locus) games, where each player has finitely many pure
strategies (alleles). Let Si, i = 1, 2 be the set of strategies for player i, and let m
def
= |S1| and
n
def
= |S2|, then such a game can be represented by two payoff matrices A and B of dimension
m × n. Players may randomize amongst their strategies. The set of mixed strategies are ∆m and
∆n respectively.
Definition 4.2. (Nash Equilibrium [34]) A strategy profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium (NE)
if no player can achieve a better payoff by a unilateral deviation [26]. Formally, (x,y) ∈ ∆m ×∆n
is a NE iff ∀x′ ∈ ∆m, xTAy ≥ x′TAy and ∀y′ ∈ ∆n, xTBy ≥ xTBy′.
Game (A,B) is said to be symmetric if B = AT . In a symmetric game the strategy sets of both
the players are identical, i.e., m = n, and S1 = S2. We will use n, S and ∆n to denote the strategy
related quantities. Strategy x ∈ ∆n is a symmetric NE, i.e., both play x, if and only if
∀i ∈ S, xi > 0⇒ (Ax)i = max
k
(Ax)k (2)
Definition 4.3. NE x is strict if ∀k /∈ SP (x), (Ax)k < (Ax)i, where i ∈ SP (x).
Symmetric Coordination Game. In a coordination/partnership game B = A, i.e., both the
players get the same payoff always. Thus if A is symmetric then (A,A) is a symmetric coordination
game. The next lemma follows using (2) and Fact 4.1
Lemma 4.4. If x is a symmetric NE of game (A,A), it is a fixed-point of dynamics (1).
From now on, by mixed (fixed-point) strategy we mean strictly mixed (fixed-point) strategy,
i.e., x such that |SP (x)| > 1, and non-mixed are called pure.
4.3 Basics in Dynamical Systems
Definition 4.5. A fixed-point r of f : ∆ → ∆ is called stable if, for every  > 0, there exists a
δ = δ() > 0 such that, for all p ∈ ∆ with ||p − r‖| < δ we have that ||fn(p) − r|| <  for every
n ≥ 0, otherwise it is called unstable.
Definition 4.6. A fixed-point r of f : ∆ → ∆ is called asymptotically stable if it stable and
there exists a (neighborhood) δ > 0 such that, for all p ∈ ∆ with ||p − r|| < δ we have that
||fn(p)− r|| → 0 as n→∞.
By definition it follows that if x is asymptotically stable w.r.t. dynamics f (1), then the set
of initial conditions in ∆ so that the dynamics converge to x has positive measure and hence
x ∈ L, therefore asymptotically stable ⊆ L. Using the fact that under f the potential function
pi(x) = xTAx strictly decreases unless x is a fixed-point, the next theorem was derived in [21].
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Theorem 4.7. ([21], § 9.4.7) A fixed-point r of dynamics (1) is stable if and only if it is a local
maximum of pi, and is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict local maximum.
As the domain of pi is closed and bounded, there exists a global maximum of pi in ∆n, which
by Theorem 4.7 is a stable fixed-point, and therefore its existence follows. However, existence of
asymptotically stable fixed-point is not guaranteed, for example if A = [1]m×n then no x ∈ ∆n is
attracting under f .
4.3.1 Stability and Eigenvalues
To analyze limiting points of f with respect to the notion of stability we need to use the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian of f at fixed-points. Let Jr denote the Jacobian at r ∈ ∆n. Following
is a well-known theorem in dynamics/control theory that relates (asymptotically) stable fixed-points
with eigenvalue of its Jacobian.
Theorem 4.8. [29] At fixed-point x if Jx has at least one eigenvalue with absolute value > 1, then
x is unstable. If all the eigenvalues have absolute value < 1 then it is asymptoticaly stable.
Definition 4.9. A fixed-point r is called linearly stable, if the eigenvalues Jr are at most 1 in
absolute value. Otherwise, it is called linearly unstable.
Theorem 4.8 implies that eigenvalues of the Jacobian at a stable fixed-point have absolute value
at most 1, however the converse may not hold. Using properties of Jx and [20], we prove next:
(see appendix A for Jacobian equations).
Theorem 4.10. The set of initial conditions in ∆n so that the dynamics 1 converge to linearly
unstable fixed-points has measure zero.
In Theorem 4.10 we manage to discard only those fixed-points whose Jacobian has eigenvalue
with absolute value > 1, while characterizing limiting points of f ; the latter is finally used to argue
about the survival of diversity. Thus it is true that L ⊆ linearly stable.
5 Convergence, Stability, and Characterization
Our primary goal is to capture limiting points of dynamics f (1), where positive measure of
starting points converge. We denote this set by L. In this section we try to characterize L using
various notions of stability, which have game theoretic and combinatorial interpretation. These
notions sandwich setwise the classic notions of stability given in the preliminaries, give us partial
characterization of L, and are crucial for our hardness results and our results on the survival of
diversity.
5.1 Stability and Nash equilibria
Given a symmetric matrix A, a two-player game (A,A) forms a symmetric coordination game.
In this section we identify special symmetric NE of this game to characterize stable fixed-points of
f . Given a profile x ∈ ∆n, define a transformed matrix T (A,x) of dimension (k − 1) × (k − 1),
where k = |SP (x)|, as follows.
Let SP (x) = {i1, . . . , ik}, B = T (A,x). ∀a, b < k, Bab = Aiaib +Aikik −Aiaik −Aikib
Since A is symmetric it is easy to check that B is also symmetric, and therefore has real eigenvalues.
Recall the Definition 4.3 of strict symmetric NE.
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Definition 5.1. A strategy x is called (strict) Nash stable if it is a (strict) symmetric NE of the
game (A,A), and T (A,x) is negative (definite) semi-definite.
Lemma 5.2. For any given x ∈ ∆n, T (A,x) is negative (definite) semi-definite iff (yTAy < 0)
yTAy ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ Rn such that ∑i yi = 0 and xi = 0⇒ yi = 0.
Using the fact that stable fixed-point are local optima, we map them to Nash stable strategies.
Lemma 5.3. Every stable fixed-point r of f is a Nash stable of game (A,A).
Since stable fixed-points always exist, so do Nash stable strategies (Lemma 5.3). Next we map
strict Nash stable strategies map to asymptotically stable fixed-points, as the negative definiteness
and strict symmetric Nash of the former implies strict local optima, and the next lemma follows.
Lemma 5.4. ([21] § 9.2.5) Every strict Nash stable is asymptotically stable.
The above two lemmas show: strict Nash stable ⊆ asymptotically stable (by definition) ⊆ stable
(by definition) ⊆ Nash stable. Further, by Theorem 4.8 and the definition of linearly stable fixed-
points we know that stable ⊆ linearly-stable. What remains is the relation between Nash stable
and linearly stable. The next lemma answers this.
Lemma 5.5. Strategy r is Nash stable iff it is a linearly stable fixed-point.
Using Theorem 4.7 and Lemmas 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 we get the following characterization among
all the notions of stability that we have discussed so far. We also remind you that
asymptotically stable ⊆ L ⊆ linearly stable.
Theorem 5.6. Given a symmetric matrix A, we have
strict Nash stable ⊆ asymptotically stable(= strict local optima)
⊆ stable (= local optima) ⊆ Nash stable = linearly stable
As stated before, generically (random fitness matrix) we have hyperbolic fixed-points and all
the previous notions coincide. Next we show invariance of (strict) Nash stable sets under affine
transformation of A.
Lemma 5.7. Let A be a symmetric matrix, and B = A + c for a c ∈ R, then the set of (strict)
Nash stable strategies of B are identical to that of A.
6 NP-Hardness Results
Positive chance of survival of phenotypic (allele) diversity in the limit under the evolutionary
pressure of selection (dynamics 1), implies existence of a mixed linearly stable fixed-point (Theorem
4.10). This notion encompasses all the other notions of stability (Theorem 5.6), and may contain
points that are not attracting. Whereas, strict Nash stable and asymptotically stable are attracting.
In this section we show that checking if there exists a mixed stable profile, for any of the five
notions of stability (Definitions 4.5, 4.6, 4.9 and 5.1), may not be easy. In particular, we show that
the problem of checking if there exists a mixed profile that satisfy any of the stability condition
is NP-hard. The reduction also gives NP-hardness for checking if a given pure strategy is played
with non-zero probability (subset) at these. In other words, it is NP-hard to check if a particular
allele is going to survive in the limit under the evolution. Finally we extend all the results to the
typical class of matrices, where exactly one diagonal entry is dominating (see Remark D.7). All
the reductions are from k-Clique, a well known NP-complete problem [5].
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Definition 6.1. (k-Clique) Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), with V vertices and E edges,
and an integer 0 < k < |V | − 1 = n− 1, decide if G has a clique of size k.
Properties of G. Given a simple graph G = (V,E) if we create a new graph G′ by adding a vertex
u and connecting it to all the vertices v ∈ V , then it is easy to see that graph G has a clique of
size k if and only if G′ has a clique of size k+ 1. Therefore, wlog we can assume that there exists a
vertex in G which is connected to all the other vertices. Further, if n = |V |, then such a vertex is
the nth vertex. By abuse of notation we will use E an adjacency matrix of G too, Eij = 1 if edge
(i, j) present in G else it is zero.
6.1 Hardness for checking stability
In this section we show NP-hardness (completeness for some) results for decision versions on
(strict) Nash stable strategies and (asymptotically) stable fixed-points. Given graph G = (V,E)
and integer k < n, we construct the following symmetric 2n×2n matrix A, where E′ is modification
of E where off-diagonal zeros are replaced with −h where h > 2n2 + 5 .
∀i ≤ j, Aij = Aji =

E′ij if i, j ≤ n
k − 1 if |i− j| = n
h if i, j > n and i = j, where h > 2n2 + 5
− otherwise, where 0 <  ≤ 110n3
(3)
Clearly, A is a symmetric but is not non-negative. Next lemma maps k-clique to mixed-strategy
that is also strict Nash stable fixed-point (FP). Note that such a FP satisfies all other stability
notions as well, and hence implies existence of mixed limit point in L.
Lemma 6.2. If there exists a clique of size at least k in graph G, then the game (A,A) has a mixed
strategy p that is strict Nash stable.
Next we want to show the converse for all notions of stability, namely if mixed-strategy exists
for any notion of the five notions of stability then there is a clique of size at least k in the graph G.
Since each of the five stability implies Nash stability, it suffices to map mixed Nash stable strategy
to clique of size k. For this, and reductions that follow, we will use the following property due to
negative semi-definiteness of Nash stability extensively.
Lemma 6.3. Given a fixed-point x, if T (A,x) is negative semi-definite, then ∀i ∈ SP (x), Aii ≤
2Aij , ∀j 6= i ∈ SP (x). Moreover if x is a mixed Nash stable then it has in its support at most one
strategy t with Att is dominating.
Nash stable also implies symmetric Nash equilibrium. Next lemma maps (special) symmetric
NE to k-clique.
Lemma 6.4. Let p be a symmetric NE of game (A,A). If SP (p) ⊂ [n] and |SP (p)| > 1, then
there exists a clique of size k in graph G.
We obtain the next lemma essentially using Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4.
Lemma 6.5. If game (A,A) has a mixed Nash stable strategy, then graph G has a clique of size k.
The next theorem follows using Theorem 5.6, Lemmas 6.2 and 6.5, and the property observed
in Lemma 5.7. Since there is no polynomial-time checkable condition for (asymptotically) stable
fixed-points4 its containment in NP is not clear, while for (strict) Nash stable strategies containment
in NP follows from the Definition 5.1.
4These are same as (strict) local optima of function pi(x) = xTAx, and checking if a given p is a local optima can
be inconclusive if hessian at p is (negative) semi-definite.
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Theorem 6.6. Given a symmetric matrix A, checking if (i) game (A,A) has a mixed (strict) Nash
stable (or linearly stable) strategy is NP-complete. (ii) dynamics f (1) has a mixed (asymptotically)
stable fixed-point is NP-hard. Even if A is a positive matrix.
Note that since adding a constant to A does not change its strict Nash stable and Nash stable
strategies 5.7, and since these two sandwiches all other stability notions, the second part of the
above theorem follows.
As noted in Remark D.7, matrix with iid entries from any continuous distribution has in expec-
tation exactly one row with dominating diagonal. One could ask does the problem become easier
for this typical case. We answer negatively by extending all the NP-hardness results to this case as
well, where matrix A has exactly one row whose diagonal entry dominates all other entries of the
row. See Appendix C.1 for details, and thus the next theorem follows.
Theorem 6.7. Given a symmetric matrix A, checking if (i) game (A,A) has a mixed (strict) Nash
stable (or linearly stable) strategy is NP-complete. (ii) dynamics (1) applied on A has a mixed
(asymptotically) stable fixed-point is NP-hard. Even if A is strictly positive, or has exactly one row
with dominating diagonal.
Hardness for Subset. Another natural question is whether a particular allele is going to survive
with positive probability in the limit for a given fitness matrix. In Appendix C.2 we show that this
may not be easy either, by proving hardness for checking if there exists a stable strategy p such
that i ∈ SP (p) for a given i. In general, given a subset S of pure strategies it is hard to check if ∃
a stable profile p with S ⊆ SP (p).
Survival of Diversity and Hardness. As discussed in Section 5 checking if diversity survives
in the limiting population of single locus diploid organism reduces to checking “if f converges to a
mixed fixed-point with positive probability”. In absence of clear characterization of the mixed limit
points of f in terms of any of the stability definition, the hardness does not follow directly from the
above result. Appendix C.3 explains how above results can be combined to obtain the following
theorem. Also see Remark C.6 on complexity of decision problem for general Nash equilibrium in
coordination games.
Theorem 6.8. Given a fitness matrix A for a diploid organism with single locus, it is NP-hard to
decide if, under evolution, diversity will survive (by converging to a specific mixed equilibrium with
positive probability) when starting allele frequencies are picked iid from uniform distribution. Also,
deciding if a given allele will survive is NP-hard.
Finally we show that even though checking is hard, on an average things are not that bad.
Specifically we show that if every entry of a fitness matrix is i.i.d. from a continuous distribution,
then the probability that diversity will survive surely is pretty high. We refer the readers to
Appendix D for details.
Theorem 6.9. If the fitness matrix is picked at uniformly at random then with significantly high
probability, at least 13 , diversity will surely survive.
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Appendix
A Missing Proofs of Section 5
A.1 Equations of Jacobian
Since f is defined on n variables while its domain is ∆n which is of n−1 dimension, we consider
a projected Jacobian by replacing strategy t with xt > 0 by 1−
∑
i 6=t xi in f .
Jxii =
(Ax)i
xTAx
+ xi
(Aii −Ait)(xTAx)− 2(Ax)i((Ax)i − (Ax)t)
(xTAx)2
Jxij = xi
(Aij −Ait)(xTAx)− 2(Ax)i((Ax)j − (Ax)t)
(xTAx)2
If x is a fixed-point of f , then using Remark 4.1 the above simplifies to,
Jxii = 1 + xi
(Aii −Ait)
xTAx
if xi > 0 and J
x
ii =
(Ax)i
xTAx
if xi = 0
Jxij = xi
Aij −Ait
xTAx
if xi, xj > 0 and J
x
ij = 0 if xi = 0
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.10
The proof of the following theorem follows the proofs that can be found in [28] To prove Theorem
4.10, we will make use of the following important theorem in dynamical systems.
Theorem A.1. (Center and Stable Manifolds, p. 65 of [31]) Let p be a fixed point for the Cr local
diffeomorphism h : U → Rn where U ⊂ Rn is an open (full-dimensional) neighborhood of p in Rn
and r ≥ 1. Let Es⊕Ec⊕Eu be the invariant splitting of Rn into generalized eigenspaces of Dh(p)5
corresponding to eigenvalues of absolute value less than one, equal to one, and greater than one.
To the Dh(p) invariant subspace Es⊕Ec there is an associated local h invariant Cr embedded disc
W scloc of dimension dim(E
s ⊕ Ec), and ball B around p such that:
h(W scloc) ∩B ⊂W scloc. If hn(x) ∈ B for all n ≥ 0, then x ∈W scloc (4)
To use the theorem above we need to project the map of the dynamics 1 to a lower dimensional
space. We consider the (diffeomorphism) function g that is a projection of the points x ∈ Rn to
Rn−1 by excluding a specific (the ”first”) variable. We denote this projection of ∆n by g(∆n),
i.e., x →g (x′) where x′ = (x2, . . . , xn). Further, we define the fixed-point dependent projection
function zr where we remove one variable xt so that rt > 0 (like function g but the removed strategy
must be chosen with positive probability at r).
Let f be the map of dynamical system (1). For a linearly unstable fixed point r we consider
the function ψr(v) = zr ◦f ◦z−1r (v) which is C1 local diffeomorphism (due to the point-wise conver-
gence of f [20] we know that the rule of the dynamical system is a diffeomorphism), with v ∈ Rn−1.
Let Br be the (open) ball that is derived from Theorem A.1 and we consider the union of these
balls (transformed in Rn−1)
A = ∪rAr
5Jacobian of h evaluated at p
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where Ar = g(z
−1
r (Br)) (z
−1
r ”returns” the set Br back to Rn). Set Ar is an open subset of Rn−1
(by continuity of zr). Taking advantage of separability of Rn−1 we have the following theorem.
Theorem A.2. (Lindelo˝f ’s lemma) For every open cover there is a countable subcover.
Therefore due to the above theorem, we can find a countable subcover for A, i.e., there exists
fixed-points r1, r2, . . . such that A = ∪∞m=1Arm .
For a t ∈ N let ψt,r(v) the point after t iteration of dynamics (1), starting with v, under pro-
jection zr, i.e., ψt,r(v) = zr ◦ f t ◦ z−1r (v). If point v ∈ int g(∆n) (which corresponds to g−1(v)
in our original ∆n) has a linearly unstable fixed point as a limit, there must exist a t0 and m
so that ψt,rm ◦ zrm ◦ g−1(v) ∈ Brm for all t ≥ t0 (we have point-wise convergence from [20])
and therefore again from Theorem A.1 we get that ψt0,rm ◦ zrm ◦ g−1(v) ∈ W scloc(rm), hence
v ∈ g ◦ z−1rm ◦ ψ−1t0,rm(W scloc(rm)).
Hence the set of points in int g(∆n) whose ω-limit has a linearly unstable equilibrium is a subset
of
C = ∪∞m=1 ∪∞t=1 g ◦ z−1rm ◦ ψ−1t,rm(W scloc(rm)) (5)
Since rm is linearly unstable, it has dim(E
u) ≥ 1, and therefore dimension of W scloc(rm) is
at most n − 2. Thus, the manifold W scloc(rm) has Lebesgue measure zero in Rn−1. Finally since
g ◦ z−1rm ◦ ψ−1t,rm : Rn−1 → Rn−1 is continuously differentiable, ψt,rm is C1 and locally Lipschitz (see
[29] p.71). Therefore using Lemma A.3 below it preserves the null-sets, and thereby we get that C
is a countable union of measure zero sets, i.e., is measure zero as well, and Theorem 4.10 follows.
Lemma A.3. Appendix of [28]. Let g : Rm → Rm be a locally Lipschitz function, then g is null-set
preserving, i.e., for E ⊂ Rm if E has measure zero then g(E) has also measure zero.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. It suffices to assume that x is fully mixed. Let z be any vector with
∑
i zi = 0 and define the
vector w = (z1−zn, ..., zn−1−zn) with support n−1. It is clear that zTAz ≤ 0 iff wTT (A,x)w ≤ 0.
So if zTAz ≤ 0 for all z with∑i zi = 0 then T (A,x) is negative semidefinite. If there exists a z with
with
∑
i zi = 0 s.t z
TAz > 0 then wTT (A,x)w > 0, so T (A,x) is not negative semidefinite.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Proof. There is a similar proof in [21] for a modified claim. Here we connect the two. First of all,
observe that if (r, r) is not Nash equilibrium for the (A,A) game then there exists a j such that
rj = 0 and (Ar)j > r
TAr. But
(Ar)j
rTAr
> 1 is an eigenvalue of Jr.
Additionally, since r is stable, using Theorem 4.7 we have that r is a local maximum of pi(x) =
xTAx, say in a neighborhood ‖x − r‖ < δ. Let y be a vector with support subset of the support
of r such that
∑
i yi = 0. Firstly we rescale it w.l.o.g so that ‖y′‖ < δ and by setting z = y′+ r we
have that
zTAz = y′TAy′ + rTAr + 2y′TAr
But y′TAr = 0 since (Ar)i = (Ar)j for all i, j s.t ri, rj > 0,
∑
i y
′
i = 0 , y
′ has support subset of
the support of r. Therefore y′TAy′+ rTAr = zTAz ≤ rTAr, thus y′TAy′ ≤ 0. Hence proved using
Lemma 5.2.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof. The proof can be found in in [21]. The sufficient conditions for a fixed point to be asymptot-
ically stable in the proof are exactly the assumptions for a fixed-point to be strict Nash stable.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 5.5
Proof. Let t be the removed strategy (variable xt) to create J
r (with rt > 0). For every i such that
ri = 0 we have that J
r
ii =
(Ar)i
rTAr
and Jrij = 0 for all j 6= i. Hence the corresponding eigenvalues of Jr
of the rows i that do not belong in the support of r (i-th row has all zeros except the diagonal entry
Jrii =
(Ar)i
rTAr
) are (Ar)i
rTAr
> 0 which are less than or equal to 1 iff (r, r) is a NE of the game (A,A).
Let Jr be the submatrix of Jr by removing all columns/rows j /∈ SP (r). Let A′ be the submatrix
of A by removing all columns/rows j /∈ SP (r). It suffices to prove that T (A, r) is negative semi-
definite iff Jr has eigenvalues with absolute value at most 1.
Let k = |SP (r)| and the k× k matrix L with Lij = ri AijrTAr and i, j ∈ SP (r). Observe that L is
stochastic and also symmetrizes to L′ij =
√
rirj
Aij
rTAr
, i.e L,L′ have the same eigenvalues. Therefore
L has an eigenvalue 1 and the rest eigenvalues are real between (−1, 1) and also A′ has eigenvalues
with the same signs as L′.
Finally, we show that det(L − λIk) = (1 − λ) × det(J′r − λIk−1) with J′r = Jr − Ik−1, namely
L has the same eigenvalues as J′r plus eigenvalue 1. It is true for a square matrix that by adding
a multiple of a row/column to another row/column, the determinant stays invariant. We consider
L−λIk and we do the following: We subtract the t-th column from every other column and on the
resulting matrix, we add every row to the t-th row. The resulting matrix R has the property that
det(R) = (1− λ)× det(J′r − λIk−1) and also det(R) = det(L− λIk).
From above we get that if Jr has eigenvalues with absolute value at most 1, then Jr − Ik−1 has
eigenvalues in [−2, 0] (we know that are real from the fact that L is symmetrizes to L′), hence L′
has eigenvalue 1 and the rest eigenvalues are in [−2, 0] (since L is stochastic, the rest eigenvalues lie
in (−1, 0] ). Therefore A′ has positive inertia 1 (see Sylvester’s law of inertia) and the one direction
follows. For the converse, T (A, r) being negative semi-definite implies A′ has positive inertia 1,
thus L′ and so L have one eigenvalue positive (which is 1) and the rest non-positive (lie in (−1, 0]
since L is stochastic). Thus Jr− Ik−1 has eigenvalues in (−1, 0] and therefore Jr has eigenvalues in
(0, 1] (i.e with absolute value at most 1).
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5.7
Proof. For equivalence of (strict) Nash stable points, the set of (strict) symmetric NE are same for
games (A,A) and (B,B), and matrix T (A,x) = T (B,x), ∀x ∈ ∆n.
B Missing Proofs of Section 6 (Hardness)
B.1 Proof of Lemma 6.2
Proof. Let vertex set C ⊂ V forms a clique of size k in graph G. Construct a maximal clique
containing C, by adding vertices that are connected to all the vertices in the current clique. Let
the corresponding vertex set be S ⊂ V (C ⊂ S), and let m = |S| ≥ k. Wlog assume that
S = {v1, . . . , vm}. Now we construct a strategy profile p ∈ ∆2n and show that it is a strict Nash
stable of game (A,A).
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pi =
{
1
m 1 ≤ i ≤ m
0 m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n
Claim B.1. p is a strict SNE of game (A,A).
Proof. To prove the claim we need to show that (Ap)i > (Ap)j , ∀i ∈ [m], ∀j /∈ [m], and (Ap)i =
(Ap)j , ∀i, j ∈ [m]. Since S forms a clique in graph G, and by construction of A, the payoff from
ith pure strategy against p is
(Ap)i =
∑
r≤m
Airpr =

∑
r≤m
1
m =
m−1
m , ∀i ∈ [m]∑
r≤m,Eir=1
1
m -
∑
r≤m,Eir=0 h <
m−1
m ∀m < i ≤ n (∵ ∃r ≤ m,Eir = 0)
k−1
m − (1− 1m) < k−1m ≤ m−1m ∀n < i ≤ 2n (∵ m ≥ k and k < n− 1)
Thus the claim follows.
Next consider the corresponding transformed matrix B = T (A, [m]) as defined in (5.1). Since
Aij = 1∀i, j ∈ [m], i 6= j and Aii = 0, ∀i ∈ [m], we have
∀i, j < m, Bij = Aij +Amm −Aim −Amj = −1 if i 6= j
= −2 if i = j
Claim B.2. B is negative definite.
Proof. It is easy to check that B has all strictly negative eigenvalues. w1 = 1m−1 is an eigenvector
with eigenvalue −m, and ∀1 < i < m, vector wi, where wi1 = 1 and wii = −1, is an eigenvector
with eigenvalue −1. Further, w1, . . . ,wm−1 are linearly independent.
Thus by Definition 5.1 p is a strict Nash stable for game (A,A).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 6.3
Proof. A negative semi-definite matrix has the property that all the diagonal elements are non-
positive. Observe that from definition of T (A, r), we can choose any strategy to be removed that
is in SP (r), hence we choose i and we look at entry Bjj = Aii + Ajj − 2Aij with j ∈ SP (r), j 6= i
which must be non-positive since T (A, r) is negative semi-definite. Hence Aii ≤ Aii + Ajj ≤ 2Aij .
Finally, if Aii, Ajj are both dominating then Aii + Ajj > Aij + Aji = 2Aij which is contradiction
since Aii +Ajj − 2Aij ≤ 0.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 6.4
Proof. Let’s define SSP (p) = {i | pi > 1n2 }. We first show |SSP (p)| ≥ k.
Claim B.3. |SSP (p)| ≥ k
Proof. Note that
∑
i∈SP (p)\SSP (p) pi ≤ n 1n2 ≤ 1n . Therefore,
∑
i∈SSP (p) pi ≥ 1 − 1n . Suppose
|SSP (p)| < k by contradiction. Then ∃r ∈ SSP (p) such that pr ≥ 1−
1
n
k−1 =
n−1
n(k−1) . Now consider
the payoff from strategy n+ r, which is
(Ap)n+r = (k − 1)pr − (1− pr) ≥ 1− 1
n
− 
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On the other hand we have
(Ap)r ≤ 1− pr ≤ 1− n− 1
n(k − 1)
Therefore,
(Ap)n+r − (Ap)r ≥ 1− 1
n
− − 1 + n− 1
n(k − 1) =
n− k
n(k − 1) −  ≥
n− k
n(k − 1) −
1
10n3
> 0
A contradiction to p being symmetric NE.
Let’s define S = {vi | i ∈ SSP (p)}. In order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show the vertex
set S forms a clique in the graph G since |S| = |SSP (p)| ≥ k.
Claim B.4. The vertex set S forms a clique in the graph G.
Proof. It suffices to show ∀i, j ∈ SSP (p) where i 6= j we have Aij = 1. Suppose not then
∃i′, j′ ∈ SSP (p) s.t. i′ 6= j′ and Ai′j′ 6= 1. We get Ai′j′ = −h by definition of A. Therefore,
(Ap)j′ ≤ −hpi′ + 1 ≤ −1 because pi′ ≥ 1n2 and h ≥ 2n2. On the other hand, we have ∀i 6∈ [n],
(Ap)i ≥ − > −1 by definition of A so we get a contradiction to p being symmetric NE.
The proof is completed.
B.4 Proof of lemma 6.5
Proof. Let p be a Nash stable strategy of game (A,A), then by definition p is a SNE and matrix
B = T (A,p) is negative semi-definite. The latter implies SP (p) ⊂ [n] using Lemma 6.3, since for
i /∈ [n] Aii = h > 2k > 2Aij , ∀j 6= i. Applying Lemma 6.4 with this fact together with the p being
an SNE and |SP (p)| > 1 implies G has a clique of size k.
C Missing Details of Section 6 (Hardness)
C.1 Hardness when single dominating diagonal
A symmetric matrix, when picked uniformly at random, has in expectation exactly one row
with dominating diagonal (see Remark D.7). One could ask does the problem become easier for
this typical case. We answer negatively by extending all the NP-hardness results of Theorem 6.6
to this case as well, where matrix A has exactly one row whose diagonal entry dominates all other
entries of the row, i.e., ∃i : Aii > Aij , ∀j 6= i.
Consider the following modification of matrix A from (3), where we add an extra row and
column. Matrix M is of dimension (2n + 1) × (2n + 1), described pictorially in Figure 2. Recall
that h > 2n2 + 5 and k is the given integer.
Mij = Aij if i, j ≤ 2n
M(2n+1)i = Mi(2n+1) = 0 if i ≤ n
M(2n+1)i = Mi(2n+1) = h+  if n < i ≤ 2n, where 0 <  < 1
M(2n+1)(2n+1) = 3h
(6)
Clearly M has exactly one row/column with dominating diagonal, namely (2n+1). The strategy
constructed in Lemma 6.2 is still strict Nash stable in game (M,M). This is because their support
is a subset of [n], implying the extra strategy giving zero payoff which is strictly less than the
expected payoff. Thus, we get the following lemma.
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Figure 2: Matrix M as defined in (6)
Lemma C.1. If graph G has a clique of size k, then game (M,M) has a mixed strategy that is
strict Nash stable where A is from (3).
Next we show the converse. Nash stable strategies are super set of other three notion of stability
(Theorem 5.6), so it suffices to map Nash stable to a k-clique. Further, if p is Nash stable then
T (M,p) is negative semi-definite (by definition). Using this property together with the lemmas
from previous two section, we show the next lemma.
Lemma C.2. Graph G has a clique of size k, if there is a mixed Nash stable strategy in (M,M).
Proof. Let q be the Nash stable strategy, then it is a symmetric NE of game (M,M), T (M, q)
is negative semi-definite, and |SP (q)| > 1. Using Lemma 6.3 we have SP (q) ⊆ [n], as for i =
2n + 1, Mii = 3h > 2Mij , ∀j 6= i implying 2n + 1 /∈ SP (q), and ∀n < i ≤ 2n, Mii = h >
2k > 2Aij , ∀j ∈ SP (q). Thus for 2n-dimensional vector p, where pi = qi, i ≤ 2n, we have
T (A,p) = T (M, q) and p is a symmetric NE of game (A,A). Thus, stability property of q on
matrix M carries forward to corresponding stability of p on matrix A. Thus the lemma follows
using Lemma 6.5.
The next theorem follows using Theorem 5.6, Lemmas 5.7, C.1, and C.2. Containment in NP
follows using the Definition 5.1.
Theorem C.3. Given a symmetric matrix M such that exactly one row/column in M has a
dominating diagonal,
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a mixed Nash stable (or linearly stable) strategy.
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a mixed strict Nash stable strategy.
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (1) applied on M has a mixed stable fixed-point.
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• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (1) applied on M has a mixed asymptotically stable fixed-
point.
even if M is a assumed to be positive.
Strict positivity of the matrix in the above theorem follows using the fact that Nash stable and
strict Nash stable strategies do not change when a constant is added to the matrix (Lemma 5.7).
C.2 Hardness for subset
Another natural question to ask is whether a particular allele is going to survive with positive
probability in the limit, for a given fitness matrix. We show that this may not be easy either, by
proving hardness for checking if there exists a stable strategy p such that i ∈ SP (p) for a given i.
In general, given a subset S of pure strategies it is hard to check if ∃ a stable profile p such that S
is a subset of SP (p).
Theorem C.4. Given a d× d symmetric matrix M and a subset S ⊂ [d],
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a Nash stable (or linearly stable) strategy p
s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a strict Nash stable strategy p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (1) applied on M has a stable fixed-point p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (1) applied on M has a asymptotically stable fixed-point p
s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
even if |S| = 1, or if M is a assumed to be positive or with exactly one row with dominating
diagonal.
Proof. The reduction is again from k-clique. Our constructions of (3) and (6) works as is, and the
target set is S = {n}.
Recall that vertex vn ∈ V is connected to every other vertex in G, and therefore is part of every
maximal clique. Thus the construction of strategy p in Lemmas 6.2 and C.1 will have pn > 0, and
therefore if k-clique exist then S ⊂ SP (p).
For the converse consider a Nash stable strategy p with {n} ⊂ SP (p). By definition it is a
symmetric NE, and therefore SP (p) 6= {n} as in all cases row n has dominated diagonal, i.e.,
Ann = 0 < k − δ = An,2n. Thus, p is a mixed profile, and then by applying Lemmas 6.5 and C.2,
for the respective cases we get that graph G has a k-clique. Thus proof follows using Theorem 5.6
and property of Lemma 5.7.
C.3 Diversity and hardness
Finally we state the hardness result in terms of survival of phenotypic diversity in the limiting
population of diploid organism with single locus. For this case, as we discussed before, the evolu-
tionary process has been studied extensively [24, 20, 21], and that it is governed by dynamics f of
(1) has been established. Here A is a symmetric fitness matrix; Aij is the fitness of an organism
with alleles i and j in the locus of two chromosomes. Thus, for a given A the question of deciding “If
phenotypic diversity will survive with positive probability?” translates to “If dynamics f converges
to a mixed fixed-point with positive probability?”. We wish to show NP-hardness for this question.
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Theorem 4.10 establishes that all, except for zero-measure, of starting distributions f converges
to linearly stable fixed-points. From this we can conclude that “Yes” answer to the above question
implies existence of a mixed linearly stable fixed-point. However the converse may not hold. In other
words, “No” answer does not imply non-existence of mixed linearly stable fixed-point. Although, in
that case we can conclude non-existence of mixed strict Nash stable strategy (Theorem 5.6). Thus,
none of the above reductions seem to directly give NP-hardness for our question.
At this point, the fact that same reduction (of Section 6.1) gives NP-hardness for all four notions
of stablity, and in particular for strict Nash stable as well as linearly stable (Nash stable) fixed-
points come to our rescue. In particular, for the matrix A of (3) non-existence of mixed limit point
in L (points where f coverges with positive probability) implies non-existence of strict Nash stable
strategy, which in turn imply non-existence of mixed linearly stable fixed-point (Theorem 5.6). If
not, then graph G will have k-clique (Lemma 6.5 and Theorem 5.6), which in turn implies existence
of a mixed strict Nash stable strategy (Lemma 6.2). Therefore, we can conclude that mixed linearly
stable fixed-point exist if and only if f converges to a mixed fixed-point with positive probability.
and thus the next theorem follows.
Theorem C.5. Given a fitness matrix A for a diploid organism with single locus, it is NP-hard to
decide if, under evolution, diversity will survive (by converging to a specific mixed equilibrium with
positive probability) when starting allele frequencies are picked iid from uniform distribution. Also,
deciding if a given allele will survive is NP-hard.
Remark C.6. As noted in Section 4.2, coordination games are very special and they always have a
pure Nash equilibrium which is easy to find; NE computation in general game is PPAD-complete [6].
Thus, it is natural to wonder if decision versions on coordination games are also easy to answer.
In the process of obtaining the above hardness results, we stumbled upon NP-hardness for check-
ing if a symmetric coordination game has a NE (not necessarily symmetric) where each player
randomizes among at least k strategies. Again the reduction is from k-clique. Thus, it seems highly
probable that other decision version on (symmetric) coordination games are also NP-complete.
D Survival of Diversity
Given a fitness (positive symmetric) matrix A. We analyze how diverse the population will be
in the limit under evolutionary dynamics (governed by f (1)). If the limit point x is not pure, i.e.,
|SP (x)| > 1 then at least two alleles survive among the population, and we say the population is
diverse and not monomorphic in the limit.
We characterize two extreme cases of fitness matrix for the survival of diversity, namely where
diversity always survives and where diversity disappears regardless of the starting population. Using
this characterization we analyze the chances of survival of diversity when fitness matrix and starting
populations are picked uniformly at random. Since every limit with postive measure of region of
attraction is Nash stable (Theorems 4.10 and 5.6), there has to be at least one mixed Nash stable
strategy for the diversity to survive. We know that given a symmetric A there always exists a Nash
stable strategy, however it does not have to be mixed.
Definition D.1. Diagonal entry Aii is called dominating if and only if Aii > Aij for all j 6= i.
And it is called dominated if and only if ∃j, such that Aij > Aii.
Next lemma characterizes instances that lack mixed Nash stable.
Lemma D.2. If all diagonal entries of A are dominating then there are no mixed linearly stable
fixed points.
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The next theorem follows using Theorem 4.10 and Lemma D.2. Informally, it states that if
every diagonal entry of A is dominating then almost surely the dynamics converge to pure fixed
points.
Theorem D.3. If every diagonal entry of A is dominating then the set of initial conditions in ∆n
so that the dynamics 1 converges to mixed fixed points has measure zero, i.e diversity dies almost
surely.
Additionally, we show that a pure fixed point that chooses strategy t, where Att is dominated,
will be linearly unstable.
Lemma D.4. Let r ∈ ∆n with rt = 1. If Att is dominated, then r is linearly unstable.
If there are no pure fixed points that are linearly stable, then all linearly stable fixed-points are
mixed, and thus the next theorem follows using Theorem 4.10 and Lemma D.4.
Theorem D.5. If every diagonal of A is dominated then the set of initial conditions in ∆n so that
the dynamics 1 converge to pure fixed points has measure zero, i.e diversity survives almost surely.
The following lemma shows that when the fitness matrix is picked uniformly at random, there is
a positive probability (bounded away from zero for all n) so that every diagonal in A is dominated.
This essentially means that generically, diversity survives with positive probability, bounded away
from zero, for all n where the randomness is taken with respect to both the payoff matrix and
initial conditions.
Lemma D.6. Let each entry of A be chosen iid from a continuous distribution. The probability
that all diagonals of A are dominated is bounded away from zero, i.e., at least 13 − o(1).
Proof. Let Ei be the event that Aii is dominating. We get that:
Pr[Ei] =
1
n
(7)
Also for n ≥ 6 we have that
Pr[Ei ∩ Ej ∩ Ek] ≤ 1
(n− 3)3 (8)
for i 6= j 6= k 6= i. To prove this let Di correspond to the events Aii > Ait for all t 6= i, j, k (in same
way the definition of Dj , Dk). Clearly Di, Dj , Dk are independent and thus Pr[Di ∩ Dj ∩ Dk] =
1
(n−3)3 . Since Ei ∩ Ej ∩ Ek ⊂ Di ∩Dj ∩Dk the inequality follows.
Finally by counting argument (count all the favor permutations) we get that
Pr[Ei ∩ Ej ] ≥
2[
∑n−2
k=0(2n− 3− k)! (n−2)!(n−2−k)! ]
(2n− 1)! =
2
n(n− 1)
n−2∑
k=0
k+1∏
i=0
n− i
2n− i− 1
for i 6= j. For l = o(n), for example l = log n and using the fact that n−i2n−i−1 is decreasing with
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respect to i we get that
n−2∑
k=0
k+1∏
i=0
n− i
2n− i− 1 ≥
l∑
k=0
k+1∏
i=0
n− i
2n− i− 1
≥
l∑
k=0
(
n− k − 1
2n− k − 2
)k+2
≥
l∑
k=0
(
n− l − 1
2n− l − 2
)k+2
=
(
n− l − 1
2n− l − 2
)2(1− ( n−l−12n−l−2)l+1
1− n−l−12n−l−2
)
=
1
2
− o(1)
Therefore (inclusion-exclusion) we have that
Pr[∪Ei] ≤
∑
i
Pr[Ei]−
∑
i<j
Pr[Ei ∩ Ej ] +
∑
i<j<k
Pr[Ei ∩ Ej ∩ Ek]
thus
Pr[∩Eci ] ≥
1
2
− o(1)− n(n− 1)(n− 2)
6(n− 3)3 =
1
3
− o(1)
which is bounded away from zero.
Remark D.7. Observe that letting Xi be the indicator random variable that Aii is dominating
and X =
∑
iXi we get that E[X] =
∑
iE[Xi] =
∑
i Pr[Ei] = n × 1n = 1 so in expectation we
will have one dominating element. Also from the above proof of Lemma D.6 we get that E[X2] =∑
iE[Xi] + 2
∑
i<j E[XiXj ] = 1 + n(n− 1)Pr[Ei ∩ Ej ] ≈ 2− o(1) (namely V ar[X] ≈ 1− o(1)) so
by Chebyshev’s inequality Pr[|X − 1| > k] is O( 1
k2
).
E Terms Used in Biology
E.1 Terms in Biology
We provide brief non-technical definitions of a few biological terms that we use in this paper.
Gene. A unit that determines some characteristic of the organism, and passes traits to offsprings.
All organisms have genes corresponding to various biological traits, some of which are instantly
visible, such as eye color or number of limbs, and some of which are not, such as blood type.
Allele. Allele is one of a number of alternative forms of the same gene, found at the same place on a
chromosome, Different alleles can result in different observable traits, such as different pigmentation.
Genotype. The genetic constitution of an individual organism.
Phenotype. The set of observable characteristics of an individual resulting from the interaction
of its genotype with the environment.
Diploid. Diploid means having two copies of each chromosome. Almost all of the cells in the
human body are diploid.
Haploid. A cell or nucleus having a single set of unpaired chromosomes. Our sex cells (sperm and
eggs) are haploid cells that are produced by meiosis. When sex cells unite during fertilization, the
haploid cells become a diploid cell.
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E.2 Heterozygote Advantage (Overdominance)
Cases of heterozygote advantage have been demonstrated in several organisms. The first con-
firmation of heterozygote advantage was with a fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. Kalmus demon-
strated in a classic paper [16] how polymorphism can persist in a population through heterozygote
advantage. In humans, sickle-cell anemia is a genetic disorder caused by the presence of two reces-
sive alleles. Where malaria is common, carrying a single sickle-cell allele (trait) confers a selective
advantage, i.e., being a heterozygote is advantageous. Specifically, humans with one of the two
alleles of sickle-cell disease exhibit less severe symptoms when infected with malaria. Theorem D.3
and lemma D.6 are related to that phenomenon.
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